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Unmanned aerial systems already started to alter contemporary militaries’ force structures. In this 
regard, the US has increased its reliance on drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan gradually. 
Moreover, various studies in the military literature have started to focus on potential future effects 
of unmanned platforms and advanced payload they carry on conduct of warfare and military 
deployments around the world. There are various subjects of debate among strategic circles on how 
much to alter force structures to eliminate the presence of the pilot in the cockpit. For example, one 
of the debates in the US consists of various views on whether unmanned strategic bomber aircraft 
would be a wise option for future contingencies.  
Moreover, the invention of and reliance on unmanned platforms may alter geo-strategic 
considerations as well. Operation of drones require infrastructure such as airfields around the world. 
Countries such as the US and the UK may consider utilization of drones when planning resource 
allocations. Besides, future aircraft carriers may carry significant numbers of unmanned aerial 
vehicles on board. As far as the current trends are concerned, political and financial limitations may 
encourage the polities to rely on unmanned aerial systems while conducting limited military 
campaigns. 
Invention and use of unmanned aerial systems is a part of evolution of airpower. Since the first uses 
of airpower in the context of conduct of warfare, how to utilize it for desired strategic effects and to 
increase overall strategic performance remains as a valid question, correlating with the enduring 
nature and dynamic characteristics of war. Consequently, how to use airpower in counterinsurgency 
and other forms of irregular warfare has remained as a significant question for strategic and 
scholarly debate.  
Since war and strategy are holistic in their nature, consisting of distinctive elements and 
dimensions, the strategic effects of using unmanned aerial systems would depend on how holistic 
the counterinsurgency operations have been conducted. Moreover, counterinsurgency is a 
  
population-centric type of war. Therefore, drone strikes are more effective in theatres in which the 
military as well as non-military aspects of counterinsurgency are applied in a holistic way.  
 
Similarly, there are two distinct ways to relate drone strikes with overall strategic objectives. If the 
drone operations are conducted in isolation and do not supplement or get supplemented by other 
dimensions of warfare, it is the strategy of compensation for lacking elements in the 
counterinsurgency campaign. Conversely, should the drone operations are conducted as a 
component of holistic campaigns, then they become force multipliers, especially in the context of 
precision strike and intelligence related capabilities.  
Since most of the literature on strategic effects of drone strikes as a component of recent campaigns 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, as well as Yemen focus on whether use of armed unmanned aerial 
systems in these theatres is productive or counterproductive, the first finding of this study that 
should be mentioned at this point is that the real problem is not whether drones are used in such 
counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaigns, but it is about how the assets as tactical means 
are used in relevance with other dimensions of strategy and war. Counterinsurgency wars are 
population-centric, that is, counterinsurgent forces must focus on disconnecting insurgent 
movements from the population, and increasing the legitimacy of the local government among the 
public.  
As mentioned earlier, strategy and war are holistic in their nature, though they include distinctive 
dimensions that contribute to the overall preparation for war, war proper, and outcomes. Moreover, 
both military and non-military characteristics of counterinsurgency wars cause the very presence of 
population-centric requirements that cannot be addressed solely with the use of airpower. This 
study, therefore, claims that drone strikes are more productive in the context of desired strategic 
objectives when they are conducted in integrated ways with other dimensions and domains of 
warfare. On the other hand, even the most tactically successful use of unmanned aerial systems 
cannot serve the strategic objectives of counterinsurgency campaigns that are political in nature.  
In fact, the drone strikes in Pakistan are irrelevant to the counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan, 
in the context of declared official objectives of the drone campaign. Moreover, strategic effects of 
drone strikes that target Pakistani Taliban are also mixed, and they are nowhere near serving to the 
defeat of insurgency in Pakistan. In sum, the “only game in town” approach does not create the 
desired outcomes. Targeted killings, signature strikes and overall counterterrorism approaches in 
isolation, that is, lacking important aspects of irregular warfare would not factually improve the 
strategic performance. Finally, a dynamic public diplomacy and transparency should accompany the 
conduct of targeted killing operations.  
  
 
Close air support and ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition, reconnaissance) are 
the most effective mission types for unmanned aerial vehicles in the context of the recent 
counterinsurgency campaigns. First of all, a major reason for this is the mentioned “only game in 
town” approach. The lack of complementary missions causes ineffectiveness of targeted killings 
with drones. Experienced and well-structured non-state armed groups are able to compensate the 
loss of their operators and leadership.  
When used in a networked way with ground forces as well as non-military aspects such as political, 
economic and information efforts, the use of drones creates a “force multiplier” effect thanks to 
their distinctive specifications such as endurance, lack of the pilot in the cockpit, and advanced 
payload.    
Finally, the use of drones would affect all the domains of conduct of warfare. First, drones are a part 
of the evolution of airpower. Future air forces will acquire and use more and more unmanned assets. 
They may enable more productive ways of use of airpower for strategic effectiveness. Secondly, the 
use of drones support ground forces effectively, especially in close air support and ISTAR missions, 
multiplying the capabilities of situational awareness. Third, drones will contribute to future naval 
warfare. For example, the ways aircraft carriers are utilized and their roles may be altered thanks to 
the drone technology, and drones may enable naval assets to eliminate modern challenges such as 
anti-access and area-denial capabilities of opposing forces. Fourth, the space domain is crucial to 
use of sophisticated modern drones. Satellite technology enables remoteness, command and control 
and ISTAR capabilities of unmanned aerial systems. Finally, drones are related with cyber domain 
to a considerable extent.  
